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Abstract
In recent years online social networks have suffered an in-
crease in sexism, racism, and other types of aggressive and
cyberbullying behavior, often manifesting itself through of-
fensive, abusive, or hateful language. Past scientific work fo-
cused on studying these forms of abusive activity in popular
online social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter. Build-
ing on such work, we present an eight month study of the var-
ious forms of abusive behavior on Twitter, in a holistic fash-
ion. Departing from past work, we examine a wide variety
of labeling schemes, which cover different forms of abusive
behavior. We propose an incremental and iterative method-
ology that leverages the power of crowdsourcing to annotate
a large collection of tweets with a set of abuse-related labels.
By applying our methodology and performing statistical anal-
ysis for label merging or elimination, we identify a reduced
but robust set of labels to characterize abuse-related tweets.
Finally, we offer a characterization of our annotated dataset
of 80 thousand tweets, which we make publicly available for
further scientific exploration.
Introduction
The rise of hateful behavior online has recently be-
come a topic of interest. The research community
has studied hate speech (Djuric et al. 2015), cyberbully-
ing (Hosseinmardi et al. 2015), and semi-organized on-
line harassment campaigns (Hine et al. 2017), while also
proposing systems to automatically detect and block
abusive behavior (Ribeiro et al. 2017, Davidson et al. 2017,
Serra et al. 2017). To their credit, social network platforms
are also taking steps to mitigate damage, e.g., providing
users with tools to flag abusive behavior (Kayes et al. 2015,
Twitter 2017).
Unfortunately, abusive content poses some unique chal-
lenges to researchers and practitioners. First and foremost,
even defining what qualifies as abuse is not straightforward,
which in turn makes it difficult to extract ground truth to
base deeper exploration off of. Unlike other types of mali-
cious activity, e.g., spam or malware, the accounts carrying
out this type of behavior are usually controlled by humans,
not bots. This makes techniques based on grouping together
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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similar messages or searching for automated activity inef-
fective. Second, this activity is not particularly common; rel-
atively few examples can be found from a random collection
of posts. Elaborate techniques must be employed to boost
the collection of minority examples for the automated tech-
niques to work.
To deal with these issues, crowdsourcing proved to be
a promising direction towards developing labeled datasets.
However, human labeling poses a number of challenges.
One of the main issues is the existence of different types
of abuse and different labels describing them (e.g., offen-
sive language, hate speech, aggressive behavior, cyberbul-
lying, etc.). It is often difficult, even for a human, to con-
sistently distinguish them (Chatzakou et al. 2017). For ex-
ample, certain types of language, such as sarcasm, can be
misinterpreted by annotators if the messages are not pre-
sented in context. Another challenge is striking a good bal-
ance between the number of annotators employed per task,
their payment, and how much time the crowdsourcing pro-
cess takes to complete.
This paper tackles three challenges faced when trying
to collect large scale ground truth on abusive behavior: (i)
difficulty of the crowdsourced workers to distinguish be-
tween different abusive categories (e.g., hate speech vs. of-
fensive language vs. abusive language), (ii) different occur-
rence rates for different categories of abuse, and (iii) scal-
ing the multi-labeled annotation process to thousand tweets,
while maintaining quality of annotation and time-budget
constraints.
Into the direction of addressing the aforementioned chal-
lenges we proceed with the following contributions:
• A methodology to detect and cut through the confusion of
crowdworkers when they are asked to distinguish between
nuanced labels.
• A boosted sampling approach that maintains an unbiased
dataset, while ensuring more annotations for the minority
class.
• The design and development of a data collection platform
that optimizes for costs.
• A dataset of 80k tweets, annotated for abusive behavior
and created following the methodology and platform we
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developed and present in this paper.1
• The open source code of the platform used for collecting
crowdsourced annotations from users.2
Related Work
In the recent past, a few datasets have been collected, anno-
tated, and released by other researchers around abusive be-
havior on Twitter, using various labels and different method-
ologies for annotation.
Wasseem and Hovy (Waseem and Hovy 2016) provide a
dataset used by several studies working on hate speech
detection (Badjatiya et al. 2017, Gamba¨ck and Sikdar 2017,
Jha and Mamidi 2017). That work focused on disambiguat-
ing different types of hate speech, and more specifically be-
tween racism and sexism, at the level of tweets (i.e., whether
a tweet is racist or sexist). The authors collected tweets
based on a set of hate-related terms and users, and manually
annotated a subset of their dataset using an outside annota-
tor for reviewing. The final dataset consists of almost 17k
tweets, 12% of which are labeled as racist, 20% sexist, and
the rest are considered normal. After the annotation process,
they investigated which features better assist the detection
of hate speech by building upon this dataset. They show that
only gender plays an important role, while geographic and
word-length distributions are typically ineffective.
(Davidson et al. 2017) provide a dataset that has
also been studied, e.g., (Malmasi and Zampieri 2017,
Olteanu, Talamadupula, and Varshney 2017). The focus of
this work was mainly to distinguish between hateful and
offensive language. According to the authors, offensive
language contains offensive terms which are not necessarily
inappropriate, while hate speech intends to be derogatory,
humiliating, or insulting. Focusing on the differences
between the two, they started their annotation process
by identifying and collecting a set of possible hateful
users and extracted their tweets. Then, they sampled this
collection for 25k tweets containing terms from a hate
speech lexicon. Finally, this sampled dataset was annotated
by CrowdFlower workers. With an intercoder-agreement
score of 92%, the majority label was offensive (77%), a
small percentage hateful (6%), and the rest were normal.
(Golbeck et al. 2017) focused on online trolling and ha-
rassment on Twitter. They first used various online sources,
e.g., blocklists, to produce a list of keywords used for col-
lecting harassing tweet with high probability. Subsequently,
they created guidelines for the annotation task and trained
coders to label the tweets using labels such as “the very
worst,” “threats,” “hate speech,” “direct harassment,” “po-
tentially offensive,” and “non-harassment.” Their aim was to
label tweets as harassing only if they really were “the worst
of the worst content.” Their final dataset includes 35k tweets
annotated by 2 or 3 coders.
The previous datasets focus on the language used by an-
notating text content. However, there are other works fo-
cusing on user characteristics, i.e., they provide annota-
tion of Twitter users based on their exhibited behavior. As
1The dataset is hosted at: http://ow.ly/BqCf30jqffN.
2The code can be found at: http://ow.ly/TnuU30jqf7g.
(Ribeiro et al. 2017) emphasize, identifying content as hate-
ful raises major issues, while “characterizing and detect-
ing hateful users [...] presents plenty of opportunities to ex-
plore a richer feature space.” Therefore, detecting inappro-
priate user behavior is a different, but closely related task.
(Chatzakou et al. 2017) detected cyberbullying and cyber-
aggression by collecting and annotating a dataset from Twit-
ter. Their annotation methodology is similar to ours in the
use of CrowdFlower for the annotation task. Their final
dataset contains 9, 484 tweets, labeled as one of four cat-
egories: 1) bullying, 2) aggressive, 3) spam, or 4) normal.
The aggressive and bullying labels make up about 8% of the
dataset, spam makes up about 33%, and the remainder of the
annotations are normal.
While the previous works fall under the same domain, i.e.,
annotating inappropriate speech, one crucial challenge still
remains unaddressed. Specifically, there is an important gap
regarding the principled selection of the most appropriate
labels for annotating aggressive online behavior. In past lit-
erature, types or labels of inappropriate speech are usually
used interchangeably, or selected randomly among available
ones for use in the annotation task. Indeed, past studies do
not explain or justify the selection of types of inappropriate
speech which they use for their annotations. Furthermore,
they either use only a subset of popular labels, and consider
the others covered (without however establishing why this
is so), or combine them together under the same umbrella
label. In this work, we take a step back and propose a prin-
cipled methodology to narrow down the list of possible la-
bels used in this space. Our methodology is iterative, to ac-
count for limited time and budget, as well as allowing for
controlled statistical analysis of label selection by annota-
tors. We use the final set of selected labels for a large scale
crowdsourcing study, annotating 80k tweets with appropri-
ate labels on abusive behavior. Table 1 summarizes the past
works relevant to the topic which have released their datasets
for scientific exploration.
Overview of Methodology
Our goal: The overall goal of this work is to create a large
and highly accurate annotated dataset of tweets (80k) via
a crowdsourcing platform like CrowdFlower (CF). Unlike
previous work, we are interested in workers selecting from
more than one potential category of abusive behavior (i.e.,
two or more labels), in order to study the correlation be-
tween them and make adjustments on the final labels used.
Annotating such a large dataset exhibits some unique chal-
lenges since we must minimize the cost without compromis-
ing the quality of the annotation. This can only be achieved
by carefully tuning the task and the platform, appropriately
selecting the samples to annotate, and striking a balance be-
tween worker payment and quality.
Challenges with Crowdsourced Platforms
There are several challenges that need to be resolved to best
balance high-quality annotations and minimal cost.
Labels: We want to build a dataset that distinguishes be-
tween various expressions of online abuse, e.g., abusive and
Dataset # Tweets Labels Annotators
(Chatzakou et al. 2017) 9, 484 aggressive, bullying, spam, normal 5
(Waseem and Hovy 2016) 16, 914 racist, sexist, normal 1
(Davidson et al. 2017) 24, 802 hateful, offensive (but not hateful), neither 3 or more
(Golbeck et al. 2017) 35, 000 the worst, threats, hate speech, direct harassment, 2-3
potentially offensive, non-harassment
Present study 80, 000 offensive, abusive, hateful speech, aggressive, 5-20
cyberbullying, spam, normal
Table 1: Summary of related work datasets.
aggressive, hateful, offensive, cyberbullying. However, even
if detailed definitions and examples are provided, crowd-
sourced workers might still find it challenging to consis-
tently label examples. Thus, the overall design of the task
(e.g., how to phrase the questions) and the selection of la-
bels to choose from is an important challenge. To address
this, we use a number of preliminary annotation rounds that
aim to identify the exact nature of any confusion. This fa-
cilitates the elimination of any ambiguity on the labels used
during the main annotation and, thus, achieving high accu-
racy and consistency.
Sampling: In the grand scheme of things, abusive tweets
are quite rare (between 0.1% and 3%, depending on the
label). Therefore, even large-scale datasets might contain
just a few samples. For typical machine learning algorithms
which can take benefit from such a dataset, few samples
means less opportunity to train on the specific behaviors,
and overall, worse classification performance. One way to
deal with this extreme imbalance is to pre-select tweets that
are likely to be abusive (e.g., those that contain known hate
words), however, this approach also biases the dataset.
To address this sampling issue, we designed a boosted
random sampling technique. A large part of the dataset is
randomly sampled, but then boosted with tweets that are
likely to belong into one or more of the minority classes. We
use text analysis and preliminary crowdsourcing rounds to
design a model that can pre-select the tweets of the boosted
set. Both sets are then mixed together and given to the
crowdsourcing platform for the final annotation.
Judgments: The next challenge to address is determining
the proper number of crowdworker decisions that are neces-
sary for a high confidence annotation. As expected, this is
largely dependent on a combination of factors: complexity
of the task, worker reward, quality of annotators, etc. The
solution we settled in is to employ a large number of anno-
tators during the exploratory rounds (up to 20 annotators per
tweet) to establish the general level of agreement we should
expect, given the number of annotators.
Payment: The payment to crowdworkers also plays an
important role in their annotations. Studies have shown that
when participants are payed fairly, it positively affects their
results, but always depending on the type of task to be per-
formed (Ye, You, and Jr. 2017). In our case, and similarly
to (Chatzakou et al. 2017), we started with a default pay-
ment scheme (5¢ for a batch of 10 tweets), and used the
preliminary rounds to adjust as needed.
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Figure 1: Data Preparation Pipeline (Step 1). Pre-filtering
and spam removal to clean tweets. (A) random set of un-
boosted tweets. (B) boosted sampling to produce a set of
tweets biased towards abusive behavior. Sub-datasets D1
and D2 are used in the subsequent Steps 2 and 3.
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Figure 2: Exploratory Analysis (Step 2). Dataset D1 is in-
puted in the platform for annotation under label set L, and
in consecutive rounds. In each round, statistical analysis per-
formed can narrow down the set of labels to L′. Final set of
labels L′′ can be inputed in Step 3.
Crowdsourcing Methodology
Our methodology addresses the above challenges via a
three-step process. We visualize these steps in three figures:
Figure 1 illustrates the preliminary data preparation process.
Figures 2 and 3 visualize the next two steps which involve
the iterative annotation rounds.
Step 1: data collection and sampling. The first step of
the process (Figure 1) is to collect a random set of tweets.
To do so, we utilize the Twitter Stream API. We store the
data in elastic search and we apply basic pre-filtering to ex-
clude spam, tweets that have no content, tweets that are not
in English, etc. Furthermore, we apply simple text analysis
and machine learning to create the boosted set of tweets, that
will be used to improve coverage over the minority classes.
Finally, we randomly sample a small dataset (D1), that is
used for the exploratory analysis, and the remainder (D2)
for the large scale annotation.
Final 
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Figure 3: Final Annotation Round (Step 3). A larger dataset
D2, with the final label set L′′ can be used for large scale
annotation. A custom-built platform used allows for better
control of the annotation flow, and reduces dependencies on
CrowdFlower specific design limitations.
Step 2: exploratory analysis. Considering the various
trade-offs among the different parameters of the annotation
task, we first introduce an iterative process that allows the
researchers to properly adjust these parameters (Figure 2).
This analysis is performed on a small sample (300 tweets in
our case), as a means to enable quick and affordable test-
ing among all the different design choices and parameters.
These parameters include the payment, type and number of
labels, presentation of these labels, number of judgments
required, trustworthiness of users, annotation process, etc.
Furthermore, this process can reveal possible points of con-
fusion (e.g., identify if two labels are frequently mixed).
During these iterations, we fine-tune the filters used to
better boost the dataset, in order to contain more samples
of the minority classes. After each iteration, an analysis of
the results can reveal if a satisfying quality is reached and
whether a given parameter has contributed to this, akin to an
A/B testing. In an ideal scenario, a researcher can execute
many such iterations to optimize better for the set of labels
to be used, the money paid to workers, etc. In practice, and
always due to limited budget and time, these iterations can
only be a handful.
In our case, the process converged after three iterations,
allowing us to identify the influence each one of the afore-
mentioned parameters has in the annotated dataset. The main
outcome of this step was to determine the most representa-
tive and clearly understood set of labels that should be used
for the large scale annotation task. It also enabled us to as-
sess the ideal number of judgments to strike a balance be-
tween cost and quality. Details about each round are given
in the following sections.
Step 3: full annotation. The third step of the process is
when we actually annotate the larger dataset (D2), using the
previously established settings and labels (L′′). As shown in
Figure 3, we built our own custom platform to host the anno-
tation task. To accommodate such a large-scale task, we also
created a database schema to store the data and the results,
and to calculate the statistics.
Step 1: Data collection and sampling
In this section, we present the data preparation procedure.
We detail how we collect and filter the data, the preprocess-
ing part, and finally the necessary sampling. The pipeline is
shown in Figure 1.
Collection
The first step of the process is to collect a random set of
tweets. To do so, we utilize the Twitter Stream API and we
collect all the tweets provided by the API (1% of the entire
traffic) during the period of 30th March 2017 - 9th April
2017, consisting of 32 million tweets in total.
Metadata Extraction
To facilitate filtering and sampling (the next two steps), each
tweet is enriched with metadata (Figure 1). First of all, from
the tweet’s content we extract the number of URLs, hash-
tags, mentions, emojis/smilies, and numerals. Furthermore,
we tag retweets and mentions. Finally, we extract metadata
from Twitter, such as the detected language, the account
age, etc. Additionally, we apply sentiment analysis, such as
polarity and subjectivity of the tweet, using the TextBlob
Python library. Finally, we count the number of offensive
terms found using two dictionaries (HateBase3 and an of-
fensive words dictionary4).
Filtering
For the entire dataset, we apply some basic preprocess-
ing in order to filter out tweets that should not be an-
notated. Firstly, we remove tweets that are considered
spam. There are numerous techniques for tweet spam
detection (Dhingra and Mittal 2015), (Santos et al. 2014),
(Wang et al. 2015), (Zhou and Sun ), (Wang 2010). Inspired
by these, we apply filtering criteria for the elimination of
such spam-related tweets. Furthermore, we only keep orig-
inal tweets (i.e., drop retweets without new content), while
also remove those that have small text content (e.g., only
URLs, images, etc.). Finally, we remove any tweets that are
not written in English, using Twitter’s language detection.
Boosted Sampling
As shown in Figure 1, after we collect and clean the data, the
next step is to create the final dataset that will be used in the
various rounds. One major issue that needs to be addressed
when considering such datasets is the class imbalance of the
behavior under study. More particularly, in the case of abuse
detection, even though inappropriate content is very frequent
in Online Social Networks, it is still a minority compared to
the tremendous amount of “normal” data produced. There-
fore, when selecting the data to create a sample that will be
annotated, it is necessary to ensure there will be plenty of in-
appropriate annotations to work with, otherwise the dataset
is not very useful for the research community. Therefore,
we follow a sampling procedure (BS) and inject the selected
data in the randomly sampled (RS) ones.
3https://www.hatebase.org
4https://www.noswearing.com/dictionary
Dataset Tweets Judg. Labels Sampling Percentage
Step 2
R1 D1 300 5 7 33% BS - 67% RS
R2 Subset of D1 88 10-20 7 92% BS - 8% RS
VR D1 300 5 4 33% BS - 67% RS
Step 3
FR D2 80k 5 4 12.5% BS - 87.5% RS
Table 2: Datasets per Round
For the boosted sample, we use the metadata extracted
earlier. We choose tweets that, based on the sentiment anal-
ysis, show strong negative polarity (< −0.7) and contain at
least one offensive word. Finally, we create two datasets: D1
is a sample of just 300 tweets that is used for the exploratory
analysis, and D2 that contains 80K tweets that will be used
for the final annotation.
Datasets
In total, we work with two datasets,D1 andD2, one for each
step. In Table 2 we present the datasets used per round with
some extra information regarding the annotations.
Step 2: Exploratory Rounds
The goal of this step is to tune the crowdsourcing parameters
on a smaller dataset, in order to quickly get some insights but
minimize the cost while doing so.
We focused our exploration on identifying the most rep-
resentative labels related to the types of abusive content. We
begin with the most extensively used labels found in litera-
ture, and at each round we looked into the results and merge
or remove labels that were frequently confused by the anno-
tators. Furthermore, these rounds helped us to further filter
spam and get a more representative boosted sampling.
We begin with a first round (R1) that includes 300 tweets
and 5 judgments per tweet. We collect annotations and as-
sess if the plurality of labels is confusing, how the spamming
annotation works, etc. Afterwards, we continue to a second
round (R2), where we focus only on the tweets that were
marked as inappropriate in the first round, but requesting a
much larger number of annotations to assess better the over-
lap of used labels. Finally, we conclude with a third round
(VR) to validate the selected labels and confirm annotation
agreement, before moving on to the Step 3 and the large
scale annotation (FR).
Definitions
Before starting, annotators are provided with definitions for
each label which they have to acknowledge reading. The
definitions are constructed based on all the descriptions we
found in the related literature, as cited on each category, as
well as Cambridge5 and Black’s Law6 dictionaries. In total,
the following definitions were displayed to the annotators:
• Offensive Language: Profanity, strongly impolite, rude
or vulgar language expressed with fighting or hurtful
5http://dictionary.cambridge.org
6http://thelawdictionary.org
words in order to insult a targeted individual or group.
(Chen et al. 2012), (Razavi et al. 2010).
• Abusive Language: Any strongly impolite, rude or
hurtful language using profanity, that can show a de-
basement of someone or something, or show intense
emotion. (Papegnies et al. 2017), (Park and Fung 2017),
(Nobata et al. 2016).
• Hate Speech: Language used to express hatred to-
wards a targeted individual or group, or is intended
to be derogatory, to humiliate, or to insult the
members of the group, on the basis of attributes
such as race, religion, ethnic origin, sexual orien-
tation, disability, or gender. (Davidson et al. 2017),
(Badjatiya et al. 2017), (Warner and Hirschberg 2012),
(Schmidt and Wiegand 2017), (Djuric et al. 2015).
• Aggressive Behavior: Overt, angry and often violent
social interaction delivered via electronic means, with
the intention of inflicting damage or other unpleasant-
ness upon another individual or group of people, who
perceive such acts as derogatory, harmful, or unwanted.
(Chatzakou et al. 2017), (Hosseinmardi et al. 2015).
• Cyberbullying Behavior: It’s the use of force, threat,
or coercion to abuse, embarrass, intimidate, or ag-
gressively dominate others, using electronic forms
of contact. It typically denotes repeated and hos-
tile behavior performed by a group or an individual.
(Chatzakou et al. 2017), (Hosseinmardi et al. 2015),
(Dinakar, Reichart, and Lieberman 2011),
(Riadi and others 2017), (Kansara and Shekokar 2015).
• Spam: Posts consisted of related or unrelated advertising
/ marketing, selling products of adult nature, linking to
malicious websites, phishing attempts and other kinds of
unwanted information, usually executed repeatedly.
• Normal: all tweets that do not fall in any of the prior cat-
egories.
Therefore, our starting set of labels L is:
L = {Offensive,Abusive,Hateful, Aggressive,
Cyberbullying, Spam,Normal}
First Round
On the first round, annotators were asked in a primary se-
lection, to first classify tweets into three general categories:
normal, spam, and inappropriate. In the case that inappro-
priate was selected, then a secondary panel offered them the
five aforementioned inappropriate speech categories. This
way, users could define more explicitly the type exhibited
by the tweet. Furthermore, they had the option to suggest a
new subcategory utilizing the “other” option and a text box.
Finally, the participants were encouraged to select multiple
subcategories whenever appropriate. The dataset described
above was sent to CrowdFlower for annotation, asking for
five judgments per tweet.
In Figures 4 and 5 we see (in blue color) some of the re-
sults of this round. Figure 4 shows the distributions of judg-
ments per inappropriate label. It is important to note here
Figure 4: Distributions of judgments per inappropriate label
for the two exploratory rounds in Step 2.
that the percentages of both rounds take under consideration
only the total amount of inappropriate labels, since these
are the ones we want to observe. We notice that Offensive
and Abusive are the most popular categories, followed by
Hateful and Aggressive. Cyberbullying is rarely used. Nor-
mal and Spam are not presented on the figure, but are very
frequently used, with a percentage of 53% for Normal, and
15% for Spam, overall.
In Figure 5 we observe the agreement of the annotators,
when there is majority voted, grouped in three majority cat-
egories, for convenience. The three categories are: i) Over-
whelming majority, when at least 80% of the annotators
agree, ii) Strong Majority, when at least 50% of the annota-
tors agree and iii) Simple majority, for the rest of the cases.
When two or more labels have equal number of judgments,
the tweet is not included in any of the three categories, since
it is not assigned with a majority vote. The results of the first
round show a clear “win” of the Overwhelming category,
which means that most participants agreed on their votes.
On the other hand, most of the judgments of this round are
Normal or Spam, therefore we can not be positive that the
majority results refer to the inappropriate labels. The confu-
sion becomes more clear when we run the second round, the
results of which are presented below.
Second Round
Results presented on the first round provide some insights
on the correlation among inappropriate speech categories.
However, our confidence on these results is low, mainly be-
cause of the low amount of annotations per tweet. For this
reason, we decide to proceed in a new annotation round.
Here, we use only the tweets that were previously annotated
as Inappropriate, with a high agreement score. In total, these
tweets are 88 out of the initial 300. Each tweet was conse-
quently annotated by at least 10 workers, but usually around
20. We kept the same setup regarding labels and instructions,
as we want to be able to compare the two rounds afterwards.
The results of Figure 4 show a similar, yet not identical,
distribution of the five labels. Offensive and Abusive are still
the “leading” labels, although Abusive is slightly more pop-
ular in this round. Hateful and Aggressive follow again, in
the same order. Finally, Cyberbullying is again very low.
On the other hand, majorities in Figure 5 have completely
Figure 5: Categories of majority distributions for all prelim-
inary rounds in Step 2.
changed. As it appears, in most cases annotators disagree
about the labels, and only very few have a high amount of
agreement. This clearly shows that the task of choosing be-
tween our set of labels is not trivial.
Comparison of the Exploratory Rounds
In order to study how labels are related, we compare the re-
sults of the previous two rounds. More specifically, we cal-
culate correlations of the various labels, measure their sim-
ilarities and report on co-occurrences. In this section, we
study these statistics and reach the final decision over which
labels will be kept for the validation round.
We begin by measuring the correlation and similarities
among the inappropriate category labels. Such correlations
and similarities will allow us to measure how closely each
label appears to have been selected with another label, given
a set of tweets. We calculate correlations and their signifi-
cance using Pearson, Spearman, and Kendall Tau Correla-
tion Coefficients. The similarity between labels is measured
using Cosine Similarity. For each pair of labels, we calculate
their similarity vectors, in order to gain some insight on the
correspondence of pairs in accordance with their ranking.
That is, for each label, we construct a vector of votes, with
each cell representing a tweet annotated. Then, we compute
the similarity of these vectors, in all-pairwise fashion be-
tween the available labels. Similarly, we compute the corre-
lation of labels using these vectors. In Table 3, we present
these results for both rounds, in order to compare.
On the first round, all three correlation coefficient metrics
show low correlation between most of the labels. The only
correlation that seems statistically significant in all cases is
between Abusive and Aggressive (p<0.05). Moreover, Ag-
gressive and Cyberbullying seem to be somewhat correlated,
but the significance is not consistent. Finally, Kendall Tau
also shows a significant relationship between Offensive and
Aggressive, which does not appear in the other two cases.
Other combinations do not exhibit important correlations.
When it comes to the second round, there are generally
low correlations with no statistical significance between the
labels, with some exceptions. Offensive and Abusive are cor-
related in statistically significant fashion (p < 0.05), and
this is consistent across all metrics. Furthermore, in most
of the cases, both are also significantly correlated to Cyber-
PCC p-PCC SCC p-SCC KTCC p-KTCC CosSim
First Round (300 tweets)
Offensive - Abusive 0.057672 0.4863 0.109460 0.1854 0.095695 0.0844 0.536908
Offensive - Hateful -0.064017 0.4395 -0.008290 0.9203 -0.007995 0.8854 0.410749
Offensive - Aggressive -0.122807 0.1370 -0.124149 0.1327 -0.110099 0.0471 0.348367
Offensive - Cyberbullying -0.083271 0.3143 -0.055111 0.5059 -0.049595 0.3711 0.209020
Abusive - Hateful -0.096501 0.2433 -0.036050 0.6636 -0.033111 0.5504 0.320653
Abusive - Aggressive 0.195979 0.0170 0.324244 0.0001 0.285359 0.0000 0.478639
Abusive - Cyberbullying 0.042049 0.6118 0.065070 0.4320 0.060229 0.2774 0.251285
Hateful - Aggressive -0.042224 0.6104 0.024063 0.7716 0.020994 0.7050 0.279881
Hateful - Cyberbullying -0.076778 0.3537 -0.080666 0.3298 -0.076305 0.1688 0.133986
Aggressive - Cyberbullying -0.142836 0.0833 -0.169740 0.0392 -0.161572 0.0036 0.066667
Second Round (88 tweets)
Offensive - Abusive 0.322597 0.0022 0.408552 0.0001 0.294481 0.0000 0.741228
Offensive - Hateful -0.076287 0.4799 -0.130442 0.2258 -0.095233 0.1889 0.544227
Offensive - Aggressive 0.056567 0.6006 0.245213 0.0213 0.186104 0.0102 0.482113
Offensive - Cyberbullying 0.230017 0.0311 0.191246 0.0743 0.157496 0.0298 0.497397
Abusive - Hateful 0.126504 0.2402 0.118195 0.2727 0.079851 0.2706 0.619584
Abusive - Aggressive 0.011576 0.9148 0.270948 0.0107 0.199341 0.0060 0.451047
Abusive - Cyberbullying 0.243139 0.0225 0.241344 0.0235 0.202128 0.0053 0.501380
Hateful - Aggressive -0.072054 0.5047 -0.039991 0.7114 -0.030565 0.6733 0.374166
Hateful - Cyberbullying 0.013788 0.8985 0.003095 0.9772 0.003917 0.9569 0.350230
Aggressive - Cyberbullying -0.001821 0.9866 0.125888 0.2425 0.109380 0.1313 0.268009
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients, p-values and Cosine Similarity values for each pair of inappropriate labels in the two Ex-
ploratory Rounds.
bullying. Spearman and Kendall also show some correlation
between Offensive and Abusive with Aggressive. Hateful,
never seems to be correlated with the rest of the labels.
Regarding the cosine similarities, we see in Table 3 that
in the first round, the values of similarities are not very high.
Nevertheless, the most highly similar pairs are Offensive and
Aggressive with Abusive. Alternatively, during the second
round, the values of the similarities are much higher than
before. Again the most similar pair of labels is Offensive -
Abusive, followed by Abusive - Hateful. We notice in gen-
eral, in this annotation round, that hateful seems to be more
related than it was on the previous round, but the correlation
results still don’t indicate a strong correspondence.
To support the previous results, we also calculate the
co-occurrences of the various labels for each one of the
three majority agreement groups (Overwhelming, Strong
and Simple). Due to space limitations, we can not fully
present the co-occurrences results here. However, we briefly
state what we observed and how they support our final learn-
ings. The results show that users seem to be very confused
about selecting a label, resulting in low levels of agreement
for most of the inappropriate tweets. On the second annota-
tion round, for example, Abusive seems to be used a lot of
times and is often the majority label, but it’s always confused
with many of the other labels (especially Offensive). Offen-
sive is also confused with Abusive and Aggressive, and fre-
quently also with Hateful. Finally, Cyberbullying never be-
comes a majority-label. As expected, this becomes more in-
tense with harder to categorize tweets, i.e., tweets that most
annotators disagreed in their judgments.
Insights learned: The results of the first two annotation
rounds allowed us to draw the following conclusions regard-
ing the use of the five inappropriate speech labels:
1. We can form three groups of labels according to their pop-
ularity: Abusive and Offensive are the two most popular
labels, Hateful and Aggressive are somewhat popular, and
Cyberbullying is rarely used.
2. Cyberbullying can be safely eliminated from the list of
inappropriate labels, mainly due to the very few times it
was selected on both the annotation rounds. This decision,
though, is also supported by the very nature of Cyberbul-
lying, which according to its definition should be repeti-
tive. Yet, in our case we have no sense of time or repeti-
tion, since we work with individual tweets.
3. Abusive, Offensive and Aggressive seem to be signifi-
cantly correlated, highly coexisting in the annotations and
very similar (according to the similarity results). Abusive
is the most popular among the three and the most central
(i.e. the other two labels are much more related with this
than with each other).
4. While Hateful is frequently coexisting with other labels,
indicating a confusion among users in the use of this la-
bel, it does not appear to be significantly correlated with
any other label. This is also supported by the definition
of Hateful, since there is a well-defined description of the
target groups of this category, compared to the rest.
Validation Round
Given the above insights, we proceed with extra validation
rounds, before the large-scale annotation. To do so, we first
remove Cyberbullying (due to point 1). Then, utilizing the
insights from point 2, we merge Abusive, Offensive and Ag-
gressive into a single category. To choose which label to use,
we run one annotation campaign for each keyword, and we
achieved similar results. Therefore, we kept Abusive as the
Figure 6: Distributions of judgments per inappropriate label
for the validation round.
keyword for this category of tweets. Finally, we decided to
keep Hateful separately, as explained in point 3. Thus, in
these validation rounds, users were presented with 4 labels:
L′ = {Abusive,Hateful,Normal, Spam}
The dataset used is againD1 (containing 300 tweets) and we
required again 5 judgments per tweet.
We begin with Figure 6, where we notice the distribution
of judgments towards labels. We see that the final inappro-
priate labels are much more frequently used now than be-
fore, something that was expected as we merged most of
them. Hateful is still not as frequent as Abusive, but it ap-
pears in almost 7% of the judgments, therefore can not be
eliminated. In the agreement graph of Figure 5, we clearly
notice a vast improvement from the previous rounds. Almost
70% of the tweets reach an Overwhelming Agreement (more
than 3 out of 5 annotators agree), while annotators disagree
highly only in very few tweets. This result is of course highly
connected with the fact that we presented a simpler task for
the workers to complete.
The correlations coefficient and similarities table (Ta-
ble 4) also depict some consistent results. More specifically,
we have statistically significant negative correlations when
observing the interactions of Abusive with all other labels
(i.e., the appearance of the Abusive label is negatively corre-
lated with the appearance of the other labels) and no impor-
tant correlation in any other combination of labels. In the last
column, we see the cosine similarities between the pairs. We
notice that the vectors are much less similar, while also Abu-
sive is clearly different than Normal and Spam and not very
similar with Hateful either. Finally, from the co-occurrences
results we saw that Abusive and Hateful are still sometimes
confused (showing that our task is still not trivial), but this
is not very frequent across tweets.
Step 3: Large Scale Annotation
Based on the decisions drawn upon the previous results, we
launched the final, large-scale annotation task of 80k tweets,
with 5 judgments per tweet. The setup for this round is kept
the same with the last validation round, since it’s already
tested. Thus, the final labels we decided upon, as analyzed
earlier, are:
L′′ = {Abusive,Hateful,Normal, Spam}
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Figure 7: Label distributions of the large-scale annotated
dataset.
Annotator Profiles
In order for CrowdFlower workers to participate in the an-
notation task, we first require some basic demographic infor-
mation, such as gender, age, annual income, level of educa-
tion and nationality. This is to have a better understanding of
the annotators’ profiles. Here, we analyze these demograph-
ics. First of all, we start with gender. Almost two thirds of
the participants are male (66.6%) and one third is female
(33.4%). Moreover, even though we provided an “other”
option, no workers selected it. Regarding their educational
level, most of them have a Bachelor Degree (48.4%), fol-
lowed by Secondary Education (29.9%) and Master’s De-
gree (20.1%), while very few have a PhD (1.6%).
The age of the participants ranges from 18 to over 87;
32.6% are between 18 and 24, 29.1% are 25-31, 18.2% are
32-38 and the remainder above 39 years old. More than half
of them claim to have an income level below e10k (57.7%),
14.4% are between e10k and e20k and the rest spread
across e20k and e100k. Finally, their nationalities vary
a lot, coming from 114 different countries in total. How-
ever, by far the most frequent country of origin is Venezuela
(48%), followed by USA (9.8%), Egypt (6.3%) and India
(4%). Overall, the annotators from the top 10 countries con-
tribute 81.2% of all annotations.
Results
The distributions of the final judgments (Figure 7) are quite
similar with the preliminary rounds. The two inappropriate
labels cover almost 20% of all judgments. Abusive is again
more popular (11%) compared to hateful (7.5%), and nor-
mal is still the most popular label (59%). However, the dis-
tribution of spam is somewhat different, since now it is more
popular than the inappropriate labels (22.5%). This change
is due to the imbalanced sampled subsets (the portion of ran-
dom samples is much higher than the boosted samples).
Regarding the three categories of agreement scores (Over-
whelming, Strong and Simple) shown in Figure 8, we ob-
serve that more than half of the tweets (∼55.9%) achieve an
overwhelming agreement, which means that at least 4 out
of 5 annotators agreed on the label. The remaining ∼36.6%
PCC p-PCC SCC p-SCC KTCC p-KTCC CosSim
Abusive - Hateful -0.378388 0.0000 -0.436322 0.0000 -0.375022 0.0000 0.382150
Abusive - Normal -0.839857 0.0000 -0.843253 0.0000 -0.738567 0.0000 0.195936
Abusive - Spam -0.314023 0.0001 -0.350580 0.0000 -0.304493 0.0000 0.136757
Hateful - Normal -0.068685 0.4101 0.024373 0.7703 0.014200 0.7992 0.406726
Hateful - Spam -0.072026 0.3876 -0.027309 0.7435 -0.025878 0.6430 0.194662
Normal - Spam 0.028358 0.7340 0.130268 0.1171 0.111400 0.0460 0.267608
Table 4: Correlation Coefficients, p-values and Cosine Similarity values for the labels of Validation Round.
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Figure 8: Distributions of categorized agreement for the
large-scale annotated dataset
of tweets reach an agreement of more than 3 out of 5 votes
and only very few (∼7.5%) achieve majority with only two
annotators. In general, these majorities show a very strong
agreement between the annotators, therefore we consider
our results robust.
Finally, we compare the two sampled categories (Random
vs Boosted sample) in Figure 9. We clearly see that, as ex-
pected, the boosted sample is by far richer in Abusive and
Hateful content than the random sample. The overall per-
centage of inappropriate tweets is not very high, due to the
fact that the samples are imbalanced (as mentioned earlier
the final dataset consisted of two subset, the random, and
the boosted, consisting of 70k and 10k entries respectively).
For the sake of deeper understanding, we also compare a
balanced set of 10k random with the 10k boosted. From this
comparison, we get a much higher percentage of inappropri-
ate tweets, that sum to a total of almost half the annotations.
In fact, there are almost as many Abusive tweets in boosted,
as Normal in random (∼35% in both cases), and a very low
total of∼4% Abusive and Hateful tweets in the random sam-
ple. This means that our decision to use a boosted sample in
our methodology proved crucial: the amount of inappropri-
ate tweets would have been too low to produce any important
results, without the boosted sample.
Conclusion
In this work, we provided a methodology for annotating a
large-scale dataset of inappropriate speech and the resulting
labeled dataset. This annotation focused on various facets
of abusive or hateful language in Twitter. We selected these
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Figure 9: Label distributions for Random vs Boosted-
Sampled categories.
two types, out of several inappropriate speech categories,
based on an empirical analysis of the relationships between
the corresponding labels. More specifically, we selected the
most popularly used types of inappropriate speech in litera-
ture, and conduct a series of annotation rounds to understand
how crowdworkers use these labels.
We analyzed these annotations in terms of correlations
and similarities between the labels, and calculated their co-
occurrences. After statistical analysis of these similarities
between labels, we merged some and eliminated others, to
conclude to the most representative set. In this case, it was
Abusive and Hateful - and eliminated some less useful such
as Cyberbullying. When we obtained the final structure of
the annotation task, we annotated the large-scale dataset.
With this present work, we make available 1) our followed
methodology, 2) our code used for the custom-built plat-
form for annotation, and 3) our final annotated dataset. We
hope these three items will be useful to the research commu-
nity of either performing annotations, or building machine
learning models on top of such datasets. As a future work,
we plan on enriching the dataset with more boosted data,
since, as we showed, they carry most of the valuable in-
formation about inappropriate speech. The updated versions
of the dataset will be maintained here: https://github.com/
ENCASEH2020/hatespeech-twitter.
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